

# New Classicists

Issue 1 February 2019

Conon's Sons and Meidias

Maria Galanaki



# Conon's Sons and Meidias: Ēthopoiia and Hypokrisis in Demosthenes' Against Conon and Against Meidias

Maria Galanaki – Democritus University of Thrace

---

## Introduction

This paper uses specific passages of the orations *Against Conon* and *Against Meidias* to demonstrate how Demosthenes creates the *ēthē* of Conon's sons and Meidias and how he uses these representations as the basis for the delivery (*hypokrisis*) of these orations, creating a performance before the eyes of the jurors. The different nature of the two speeches of Demosthenes -- *Against Conon* is a private speech, while *Against Meidias* is a public speech -- offers us the unique opportunity to compare the convergences and divergences in *ēthopoiia* and *hypokrisis*. For, as it has rightly been argued, the nature of the case affected the options available to the speakers in terms of the content of their speech, the arguments, and the rhetorical strategies.<sup>1</sup> In what follows, I aim to examine how the *ēthē* of Conon's sons and of Meidias are sketched and how these passages may have been delivered in order to show how the orator tries to stir up the emotions of the audience in the law-court, creating the "performance" of these orations. Although we cannot hope to recover all delivery ploys and despite the fair amount of speculation involved in this enterprise, we can nevertheless, by examining the transmitted oratorical script and using even lacunose information in ancient (mainly rhetorical) treatises, identify a substantial number of opportunities for effective delivery.<sup>2</sup>

## Performance and Forensic Oratory

We tend to think of performance as being exclusively connected with drama and as involving the enactment of a dramatic play by a group of actors (*hypokritai*) before an audience in a

---

<sup>1</sup> Rubinstein (2004) 187-203, (2005) 129-45; Serafim (2018) 26-41.

<sup>2</sup> I am more than grateful to Andreas Serafim for his valuable help and insightful comments which led to the fulfillment of this paper.

venue suitable for staging (*theatron*).<sup>3</sup> The attempt to trace the performative elements of the transmitted oratorical scripts, encompassing a broad scope covering both direct/sensory and cognitive/emotional techniques, is a more recent trend in scholarly research. Andreas Serafim, in his monograph *Attic Oratory and Performance*, refers to this distinction between direct/sensory techniques, on the one hand, which refer to gestural and vocal ploys of what ancient sources call *hypokrisis*. Cognitive/emotional stratagems refer to the more subtle communication between the speaker and the audience, which is not directly sensory, but which still contribute to the overall performance.<sup>4</sup> Hitherto, only a few works of scholarship on ancient oratory have examined the performance dimension of *ēthopoia*, frequently without drawing the issues together in a *fully* comprehensive way.<sup>5</sup> In what follows, I elaborate on the performative dimension of both *ēthopoia* and *hypokrisis*, discussing, at the same time, their connection with the theatre.<sup>6</sup>

As far as *ēthopoia* is concerned, Aristotle's analysis of *ēthos* in the *Rhetoric* and in the *Poetics* underlines this connection between theatre and the law-court. For him, there is an analogy between two "kinds" of *ēthos*:<sup>7</sup> the dramatic author must create the characters' *ēthē* for his actors to embody on stage, just as the *logographos* must develop a suitable characterization for his clients/litigants, typically one that impersonates the State's common *ēthē*. In both cases, the goal is the same: the achievement of verisimilitude; that is, the successful presentation of character depictions that have the potential to convince the audience. Even in a case of a forensic oration, the orator is not so much concerned with the facts as he is with plausibility<sup>8</sup>. Aristotle is clear about the fact that the presentation of the appropriate character leads to persuasion<sup>9</sup> and that this kind of persuasion is achieved *dia tou logou*.<sup>10</sup> In the *Rhetoric*, Aristotle elaborates on the *ēthē* of the young, as well as of the elder, so as to conclude that audiences tend to give credit to speeches that describe *ēthē* similar to their own ones and that *logos* becomes the means of persuasion. On the other hand, in the *Poetics*, the strong connection between rhetoric and the theatre is stated,<sup>11</sup> whilst it is shown how the *ēthē* are closely related to *logos*, actions and purposes of actions.<sup>12</sup> It

---

<sup>3</sup> For the nature and origin of drama see Shepherd and Wallis (2004) 57-61; Fischer-Lichte (2010) 29-42. For the character of performance in different contexts see the Introduction in Stehle (2014) 3-25.

<sup>4</sup> See Serafim (2017).

<sup>5</sup> Manuwald (2004) 51-69; Duncan (2006) esp. 58-89.

<sup>6</sup> Hall (1995) 39-58 discusses the convergences between theatrical and oratorical performances.

<sup>7</sup> For a thorough examination of the correspondences see Kirby (1991) 200-203.

<sup>8</sup> See *Rhet.* 1356a 1-23. For a thorough study of plausibility and the *eikós* in the attic orators see Schmitz (2000).

<sup>9</sup> *Rhet.* 1356a 1-4, 1403b 9-13.

<sup>10</sup> *Rhet.* 1356a 18-20.

<sup>11</sup> 1450b 7-9.

<sup>12</sup> 1454a 17-19

is thus clear that *ēthopoia* is a practice associated with both the theatre and oratory and that character creation has an undoubtful performative role.

It is necessary to give the meaning of the term *hypokrisis*.<sup>13</sup> In *Rhetoric*, Aristotle makes a strong connection between delivery and both *ēthos* and *pathos*, meaning that the delivery of a speech should take into consideration the character representation and the expression of emotions,<sup>14</sup> and he also stresses that delivery “is a matter of how to use the voice for each particular emotion”.<sup>15</sup> He also mentions the term *lexis agonistikē*, which is *hypokritikotatē*, the most suitable for delivery.<sup>16</sup> This competitive, “agonistic” style suits forensic orations and its purpose is fulfilled through the oral “performance”, the delivery of the speech.<sup>17</sup> Demosthenes himself used the verb *agonizesthai* as a synonym to *hypokrinesthai*.<sup>18</sup>

In what follows, I aim to examine *ēthopoia* and *lexis/style*<sup>19</sup> and their performative aspects. According to Richard Schechner, “to treat any object, work or product “as” performance... means to investigate what the object does, how it interacts with other objects or beings and how it relates to other objects or beings.”<sup>20</sup> Simon Goldhill, in his “Programme notes”, argues that “performance” in a broad sense is a key element in the life of the Athenian democratic citizen; he specifically relates the notion of performance with *agōn* (contest), *epideixis* (display), *schēma* (self-presentation) and *theōria* (spectating), suggesting that these terms show the “instructive power of the idea of performance culture” in the Athenian society, which can be seen in oratory as well. The elite speakers in the Assembly dramatized their contesting positions (*agōn*) before the spectating audience (*theōria*) and this rhetorical display (*epideixis*) was aiming at their self-presentation (*schēma*). Consequently, my purpose is to discuss *ēthopoia* and delivery in the above mentioned orations, taking into consideration their performative potential as means of establishing and advancing the speaker’s self-presentation on the one hand and the relationship between the speaker and the audience as well.<sup>21</sup> As Richard Schechner unequivocally puts it,

---

<sup>13</sup> For the importance of *hypokrisis* in ancient oratory see Arnott (1991) 51-54; Gunderson (2009) 88-100.

<sup>14</sup> *Ēthos*: 1388b31-1391b7, *pathos*: 1378a31- 1388b30. Cf. Quint. *Inst. Or.* VI, 2, 8.

<sup>15</sup> *Rhet.* 1403b26. Later on, Cicero (*De Or.* 2. 182) discusses the importance of the tone of voice for the orator to express particular emotions and concludes that delivery is strongly connected to emotions (3. 216).

<sup>16</sup> *Rhet.* 1413b3-1414a20. See also Sonkowsky (1959) 258-261.

<sup>17</sup> Graff (2001) 21, 33-35; Sifakis (1998) 25; Innes (2007) 162-163.

<sup>18</sup> Sifakis (1998) 25.

<sup>19</sup> For the various meanings and translations of the notion see Ricoeur (1996) 370.

<sup>20</sup> Schechner (2006) 38.

<sup>21</sup> See Goldhill and Osborne (1999) 1-29 for a discussion of performance in various aspects of the Athenian life. For a study of an aspect of performance in relation to ancient oratory see Gunderson (2000).

performance can be seen in every aspect of everyday life, as long as people communicate with each other.<sup>22</sup>

## Against Conon

In *Against Conon*, Demosthenes writes in favour of Ariston, who brings into court an action for battery (*dikēn aikeias*)<sup>23</sup> against Conon. Ariston accuses Conon and his sons of physically assaulting him, not only once, but twice, and that the assault upon him was deliberate. Indeed, he argues that he could have brought a *graphēn hybreōs*<sup>24</sup> against Conon and his sons, instead of the *dikēn aikeias*, because the assault upon him was clearly, as he asserts, a very serious one, which could have led to his death. He also attempts to show that the intention behind the assault was his humiliation and implies that Conon and his sons wanted to show their superiority over him, showing contempt of his rights as a democratic citizen.<sup>25</sup> Ariston does not, however, take the risk involved with a *graphēn hybreōs*, which would have been a difficult case for him to prove, since he would have to convince the jury of the hybriotic motives of the offender, rather than just narrating the facts.<sup>26</sup> This is why the chances of a successful prosecution were greater in a *dikēn aikeias*, where the proof of the fact of the assault was enough for a successful outcome for the plaintiff. It should be noted here that, in a case of *aikēia*, what mattered most was to prove who initiated the violent acts, *arkhōn heirōn adikōn* (ἄρχων χειρῶν ἀδίκων).<sup>27</sup>

This study of the *ēthopoia* in *Against Conon* will begin with a reading of sections 3-5, in which it is narrated how Conon's sons, in a drunken state, abused Ariston's slaves and finally assaulted Ariston as well two years previously at Panactum, while Ariston was there on garrison duty. Ctesias, one of Conon's sons, made a second, much more violent, attack on Ariston some time afterwards, again whilst drunk, together with his father and other drunken friends.

---

<sup>22</sup> Schechner (2006) 49-50.

<sup>23</sup> Fisher (1992) 39: a *dikēn aikeias* was open only to the victim and the criterion was that the accused "had struck the first blow".

<sup>24</sup> For the difference between private and public trials see Osborne (1985) 40-46. The law about *hybris* lies in Dem. 21.47: "ἐὰν τις ὑβρίζει εἰς τινά, ἢ παῖδα ἢ γυναῖκα ἢ ἄνδρα, τῶν ἐλευθέρων ἢ τῶν δούλων, ἢ παράνομόν τι ποιήσῃ εἰς τούτων τινά, γραφέσθω πρὸς τοὺς θεσμοθέτας ὁ βουλόμενος Ἀθηναίων οἷς ἔξεστιν": (If anyone assaults any child or woman or man, whether free or slave, or commits any unlawful act against anyone of these, any Athenian citizen who desires so to do, being qualified, may indict him before the Judges (Translation by J.H. Vince 1935, Loeb Classical Library). See also Harris (2008) xxvi.

<sup>25</sup> *Hybris* is closely related to arrogance, according to Aristotle (*Rhet.* 1378b14-29). See also Cairns (1996) 2-4 and Fisher (1992) 7-8.

<sup>26</sup> For Ariston's preference for bringing a *dikēn aikeias* see MacDowell (1978) 131-132.

<sup>27</sup> See Wilson (1991) 165.

Initially, Demosthenes' choices in vocabulary and syntax are worth examining. Ariston starts his narration of the facts with the verb ἔπινον; it is very important that he puts emphasis on this, because everything that follows in the description of the actions of the defendants, will be the result of their drunkenness. This is why he says that they were drinking the whole day and places ὅλην separately, to emphasize it.<sup>28</sup> He then uses two verbs in past continuous, τοῦτο διετέλουν ποιοῦντες and ἐπαρώνουν, in order to show the duration of the drinking. Also, the proverb παρά in this verb (παροινέω) shows that the drinking was out of control.<sup>29</sup>

Then, when he speaks about the violent and humiliating behaviour of Conon's sons to the slaves, he uses polysyndeton (πολυσύνδετον), with a four-fold repetition of καί: ἔτυπτον καὶ τὰς ἀμίδας κατεσκεδάννυον καὶ προσεούρουν, καὶ ἀσελγείας καὶ ὕβρεως οὐδ' ὀτιοῦν ἀπέλειπον. The three verbs ἔτυπτον - κατεσκεδάννυον - προσεούρουν describe insulting and, as far as the last two are concerned, disgusting acts towards the slaves. ἔτυπτον needs no further explanation – it means “to beat up”. προσεούρουν also, having the prefix πρὸς, means to urinate on someone. κατεσκεδάννυον meanwhile does not just carry the meaning of “scattering”<sup>30</sup>, since the preposition κατὰ shows the intension of the scattering towards both directions, “here and there”.<sup>31</sup> Here, therefore, κατεσκεδάννυον would mean “completely scatter”. The fact that Demosthenes uses three verbs, with a particularly intense meaning, in the past continuous, and reinforced by *polysyndeton*, suggests this is a conscious device to show the duration and excess of the improper and impertinent behaviour.

What is most important in this part of his oration is that Demosthenes concludes the first set of ungentlemanly actions by Conon's sons with the remark that ἀσελγείας καὶ ὕβρεως οὐδ' ὀτιοῦν ἀπέλειπον. He uses *aselgeian* and *hybrin*, two notions which both refer to intentional offensiveness and impiety. It is interesting to note that Ariston mentions the term *hybris* twenty-two times in the whole oration, despite the fact that his case is for *aikēian* (battery), which was a private offence, and not *hybrin*. Even the first word of his oration is a derivative of *hybris* (ὕβρισθεῖς). What Ariston wants to demonstrate is that he was attacked by people who showed him great disrespect (ἠσέλησαν), which could be levelled up to *hybris*<sup>32</sup>, since the offenders

---

<sup>28</sup> Carey (1985) 78: “the normal time for such a heavy drinking would be at a symposium after the evening meal.”

<sup>29</sup> In oratory, drunkenness is considered with indulgence or severity, according to the case. In the case of Meidias, it is stressed that he did not have the extenuation of drunkenness when he turned against Demosthenes.

<sup>30</sup> See LSJ, lemma κατασκεδάννυμι.

<sup>31</sup> See Smyth: Greek Grammar, p. 474-475.

<sup>32</sup> *Hybris*, according to Aristotle, is to do and say embarrassing things in order for the offender to please himself, through the supremacy he is led to feel: In *Rhet.* 1378b 3 it is stated that “Ἔστι γὰρ ὕβρις τὸ πράττειν καὶ λέγειν ἐφ’ οἷς αἰσχύνῃ ἔστι τῷ πάσχοντι, μὴ ἵνα τι γίγηται αὐτῷ ἄλλο ἢ ὅ τι ἐγένετο, ἀλλ’ ὅπως ἡσθη: οἱ γὰρ ἀντιποιοῦντες οὐχ ὕβριζουσιν ἀλλὰ τιμωροῦνται. Αἴτιον δὲ τῆς ἡδονῆς τοῖς ὕβριζουσιν, ὅτι οἴονται κακῶς δρῶντες αὐτοὶ ὑπερέχειν μᾶλλον: Insolence is also a form of slighting, since it consists in doing and saying things that cause shame to the victim, not in order that anything may happen to yourself, or because anything has happened

were far from *sophrones* and demonstrated great arrogance. The question raised here, then, is why Ariston chose to bring a case for battery and not *hybrin*? He gives his own answer to this question in the *prooimion*, which is, more or less, that he did not bring a *graphēn hybreos* against Conon and his sons due to his humility and modesty.<sup>33</sup> In section 6, Ariston repeats his reluctance to be involved in a court case: μὰ τοὺς θεοὺς οὐ μὴν ἔγωγ' ὀρόμην δεῖν οὔτε δίκην λαχεῖν αὐτοῖς οὔτε λόγον ποιεῖσθαι τῶν συμβάντων οὐδένα.<sup>34</sup> To strengthen this impression, he also mentions that he was not the only one who complained to the *strategus* about Conon's sons' bad behaviour; on the contrary, all of the other hoplites did so: τῷ στρατηγῷ τὸ πρᾶγμα εἶπομεν κοινῇ πάντες οἱ σύσσιτοι προσελθόντες, οὐκ ἐγὼ τῶν ἄλλων ἔξω. This is a *locus communis* in forensic oratory, since a humble and ἥσυχος litigant makes a much better impression than the opposite approach. Despite the fact that this trial was a private one, the speaker uses the term *hybris*, so as to strengthen his arguments.

It is important to note that the reaction of Ariston and his friend is described by the participle ὀρῶντες, which proves that they did not take any action against the gang. Demosthenes then uses the verb ἀπεπεμνάμεθα, which here means that Ariston and his friend ignored the incident. In section 5, Ariston gives us a long sentence, where, with a fast, non-stop narration, he presents what happened after he and his fellow soldiers complained to the *strategus* about the behaviour of the sons of Conon. He begins with the participles λοιδορηθέντος ἐκείνου and κακίσαντος which mean that the *strategus* censured them for their behaviour not only towards Ariston, but, in general for how they behaved themselves at the camp (περὶ ὧν ὅλως ἐποίουν ἐν τῷ στρατοπέδῳ). They not only did not show any shame for their acts, however, but they also did not cease to cause problems (τοσοῦτου ἐδέησαν παύσασθαι ἢ αἰσχυνοθῆναι). As soon as it became dark, they attacked Ariston and his fellow hoplites by jumping into their scene, swearing at and beating Ariston and making so much noise that the *strategus*, the *taxiarchus* and some of the other soldiers came in and all of them tried to stop the assaulters, because, as Ariston again does not

---

to yourself, but simply for the pleasure involved. Retaliation is not 'insolence', but vengeance. The cause of the pleasure thus enjoyed by the insolent man is that he thinks himself greatly superior to others when ill-treating them (Translation by W. Rhys Roberts, <https://ebooks.adelaide.edu.au/a/aristotle/a8rh/index.html>). See also Fisher (1992) 7-8; Cairns (1996) 2-4; Harris (2008) 81.

<sup>33</sup> πάντων δὲ τῶν φίλων καὶ τῶν οἰκείων, οἷς συνεβουλευόμην, ἔνοχον μὲν φασκόντων αὐτὸν ἐκ τῶν πεπραγμένων εἶναι καὶ τῆ τῶν λωποδυτῶν ἀπαγωγῆ καὶ ταῖς τῆς ὕβρεως γραφαῖς, συμβουλευόντων δέ μοι καὶ παραινούστων μὴ μείζω πράγματ' ἢ δυνήσομαι φέρειν ἐπάγεσθαι, μηδ' ὑπὲρ τὴν ἡλικίαν περὶ ὧν ἐπεπόνθειν ἐγκαλοῦντα φαίνεσθαι, οὕτως ἐποίησα καὶ δι' ἐκείνους ἰδίαν ἔλαχον δίκην, ἡδιστ' ἄν, ὃ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, θανάτου κρίνας τουτονί: All my friends and relatives, whose advice I asked, declared that for what he had done the defendant was liable to summary seizure as a highwayman, or to public indictments for criminal outrage; but they urged and advised me not to take upon myself matters which I should not be able to carry, or to appear to be bringing suit for the maltreatment I had received in a manner too ambitious for one so young. I took this course, therefore, and, in deference to their advice, have instituted a private suit, although I should have been very glad, men of Athens, to prosecute the defendant on a capital charge (Translation by Norman W. DeWitt and Norman J. DeWitt).

<sup>34</sup> However, on my own part I swear by the gods I never saw fit to bring an action against them, or to pay any attention to what had happened.

fail to mention, they were excessively drunk (παροινουμένους). Ariston deliberately also mentions that it was late at night and dark, so as to show that the attack was insidious; the lads “jumped” (εἰσεπήδησαν) into the scene of Ariston, used abusive language, verbal violence that is (κακῶς ἔλεγον), and caused serious injuries (πληγὰς ἐνέτειναν) to him and his friends. All in all, their actions were at the least insulting in every aspect: psychological, moral, physical; and Demosthenes’ use of the above-mentioned verbs: εἰσεπήδησαν, κακῶς ἔλεγον, πληγὰς ἐνέτειναν corresponds perfectly to this division. The result of all this is that they caused shouting and noise (κραυγὴν καὶ θόρυβον), disturbing the normality of the camp, so that the authorities needed to intervene in order to prevent anything ἀνήκεστον (not able to be rectified) from happening. The narration at this point becomes very detailed, fast and descriptive, so as to “present” what exactly happened on the specific night. If we examine carefully the facts that Ariston narrates in sections 3 to 9, we will see the immoral behaviour of people in a symposium, people who are members of a *kōmos*,<sup>35</sup> which means that they are involved in situations where they drink excessively, get out of control and start taunting others.<sup>36</sup> Their mischievous acts may look like the mere playful behaviour of a group of youngsters, but this is exactly the perception that Ariston aims to challenge; their revelry is by no means innocent humour, on the contrary, it reveals their contemptuous aggression.<sup>37</sup> So, what Demosthenes succeeds in doing here is to arouse negative feelings to the judges and audience about the defendants,<sup>38</sup> since he pictures them as an uncontrollable gang of riotously drunk young men, in spite of the disciplined military environment of the camp, who became violent and malicious to Ariston, without him having previously shown any provocative behaviour towards them.

The orator so far has demonstrated, by employing suitable style, the *ēthē* of Conon’s sons, which are far from the decorum of the classical Athenian. It is important to stress that the *ēthopoia* of the defendants is founded on the exploitation of what is seen and what is heard of, images and sounds. The mention of drinks, urine, the scattering of clothes, together with the screaming and swearing, function as performative actions which form the narration of immoral deeds.<sup>39</sup> The audience becomes the spectator (*theōros*) of a staged scene, for which they will be called to make a judgement. As Schechner asserts, “performances exist only as actions, interactions, and

---

<sup>35</sup> For an extensive analysis of κῶμος see Pickard-Cambridge (1962) 132-162 and Pütz (2007) 121-28.

<sup>36</sup> This is consistent with the depiction of the defendants in §14. See also Carey (1985) 86-87.

<sup>37</sup> See Halliwell (1991) 287-288.

<sup>38</sup> For the implementation of drunkenness in the attic orations see Goldhill and Osborne (1999) 160 and Fisher (1990) 129-132. See also Lanni (1997) who comments on the reactions of *periestēkotes* during the trial and their effects on litigants and jurors.

<sup>39</sup> This narration may bring to mind the messenger’s narration in tragedy, since in both cases the speaker narrates actions that form an *ēthos*. Confer, e.g. the guard’s narration in 249-277 of Sophocles’ *Antigone*, where the guard narrates the facts about Polyneikē’s funeral and the guards’ thoughts and actions, employing description, images, sounds, so that the *ēthos* of the non-culprit guard is being formed.



relationships”;<sup>40</sup> on the other hand, in an oratorical speech, the triangulation of relationships is shaped between the two opponents and the audience, forming a three-cornered dialogue.<sup>41</sup> Studying the *ēthopoia* of Conon’s sons, the three-cornered dialogue takes place between the plaintiff Ariston, who attacks his opponents by creating negative impressions for them to the audience, while, on the other hand, the defendants must counteract these impressions so as to receive the vote of acquittal. In other words, this section of *Against Conon* serves as a good case study of how *ēthopoia* may have a performative dimension, apart from the rhetorical one, by assessing the actions of the speaker’s opponents and by showing how the presentation of these actions affects the audience, who will later be called to evaluate them by their judgement.

On the other hand, the way in which Demosthenes has organized §5 in small syntactical colons, which are either separated by commas or connected with “and”, helps as far as the *hypokrisis* is concerned, because the speaker would suitably adjust his voice and, consequently, his gestures according to what he wants to stress. Therefore, Ariston would pronounce the colons from φήσαντες γὰρ up to οὐδ’ ὅτι οὖν ἀπέλειπον by emphasizing καί, which appears four times and conjoins the ignominious acts of the offenders. The speaker could also stress the *polysyndeton*, so as to co-ordinate the accumulation of the disgraceful acts.<sup>42</sup> The *homoeoteleuton* which can be seen in the verbs ending with the syllable –ον emphasizes the acts which are connected with the *polysyndeton*.<sup>43</sup> It might be expected that the speaker would most probably adopt a disgusted expression<sup>44</sup> when pronouncing τὰς ἀμίδας κατεσκεδάννυον καὶ προσεούρουον and also that the tone of voice would be more intense on the word ὕβρεως, because this is what the speaker in particular wants for the jurors to have in mind. In addition, the colons from λοιδορηθέντος δ’ αὐτοῖς up to παροινουμένους ὑπὸ τουτωνί form a lengthy periodic sentence which needs to be uttered with voice crescendo,<sup>45</sup> with an intense tone on the conjunction οὐ μόνον - ἀλλὰ καὶ<sup>46</sup> περὶ ὧν ὅλως ἐποίουν. The sentence τοσούτου ἐδέησαν παύσασθαι ἢ αἰσχυνθῆναι, which follows immediately afterwards, is a crucial point in the oration, since it shows the insolence of the assaulters, and therefore has to be pronounced in a strong voice. As the speaker proceeds to utter

---

<sup>40</sup> Schechner (2006) 38.

<sup>41</sup> See Classen (1991).

<sup>42</sup> Wooten (1997) remarks that "style is never simply ornamentation but reflects content". In the *First Philippic* 7, simple, straightforward clauses connected with polysyndeton are used to emphasize the consequences of the acts of the Athenians. See also Lausberg (1998) 306.

<sup>43</sup> Lausberg (1998) 323.

<sup>44</sup> For the sentiment of disgust and its utilization in attic oratory see Webb (2013) 68, who connects disgust with *ekphrasis*, and Worman (2008). See also Cirillo (2009).

<sup>45</sup> Quint. XI 3. 62: the voice is the index of the mind. See also Gunderson (2009) 86-100 for an analysis and sources of the functions of voice in delivery.

<sup>46</sup> For the *kat' arsin kai thesin* figure of speech see Herm. *On Style* 1.11.400-406.

the next colons, ὥστ' ἐπειδὴ θᾶπτον συνεσκότασεν... παροινουμένους ὑπὸ τουτωνί, his tone of voice must become more intense still, since this is the part that describes the offenders' abusive acts towards Ariston.

Also, τοσαύτην in **τοσαύτην** κραυγὴν καὶ θόρυβον, καὶ in ὥστε **καὶ** τὸν στρατηγὸν **καὶ** τοὺς ταξiάρχους ἐλθεῖν **καὶ** τῶν ἄλλων στρατιωτῶν τινάς, ἀνήκεστον and παροινουμένους must be stressed, so that the audience will receive the message that Conon's sons were behaving like a street gang and their insolence was so excessive that it required the intervention of the authorities. We can also deduce that the speaker would adjust his facial expressions to what he uttered, to encourage the audience to share his negative feelings for Conon's sons: repulsion, hatefulness, disgust.

These are only some indicative assertions of the many more which could be made for the specific sections. All in all, the argument which is made here is that Demosthenes sketches the *ēthos* of Conon's sons and employs adequate *lexis/style*, so that certain negative *pathē* will be aroused in the audience towards the offenders. In spite of the private character of the trial, he employs techniques usual in public speeches, mainly the presentation of the opponents as public dangers. However, some dark points remain dark and unnoticed. Thus, it is highly suspicious<sup>47</sup> that the *strategus* did nothing to punish the young men, although Ariston describes their behaviour as highly insulting towards the moral code of the Athenians at that time and, what is more, Ariston says that they generally misbehaved themselves throughout their stay at Panactum.

### Against Meidias

*Against Meidias*, unlike *Against Conon*, is a public case. Demosthenes wrote this speech to accuse Meidias of insulting behaviour, when Demosthenes was a *choregos* at the Great Dionysia of 348 BC (the date is uncertain).<sup>48</sup> Meidias did whatever he could to make things hard for Demosthenes: he destroyed the chorus costumes, tried to bribe Demosthenes' chorus-trainer, the judges and the magistrates. Worst of all, Meidias slapped him on the face in the theatre of Dionysus and tore apart his clothes in the presence of the audience which crowded the theatre. In general, Meidias acted in full premeditation, according to Demosthenes.

---

<sup>47</sup> See Carey (1985) 80-81 and Morford (1966) 241-248.

<sup>48</sup> For the date of the oration see Harris (1989) 121-123 and MacDowell (1990) 10-11.

A few days later, Demosthenes brought a *probolē*<sup>49</sup> against Meidias in the ecclesia and the crowd voted against Meidias, so Demosthenes was free to bring him to the court of *Hēliaia* for a trial. Nevertheless, Demosthenes withdrew the case, whilst the written oration, as we have it, was never pronounced in court, we suppose due to the fact that he was very young at the time and it was quite possible that he would face defeat in court. The fact that the speech was never delivered in court may be why there are some imperfections in its form and content, and scholars have tended to the conclusion that its final form would have been very different from what has come down to us, if Demosthenes had continued working on it.<sup>50</sup>

A very important point which is stressed in this oration is the fact that Meidias attacked Demosthenes when he was a *choregos*. Athenian law paid considerable respect to the rich who served the city by offering their fortunes for public duties, such as for military services and festivals, and such contributors were considered as public benefactors. The *choregoi*, to whom the city of Athens owed the splendour of its great festivals, were afforded especial respect and appreciation from the citizens and the authorities.<sup>51</sup> Demosthenes begins his argumentation on this basis, that Meidias assaulted him when he was serving his city under a public duty, and that by doing so he was therefore assaulting the whole city and the people who were celebrating the festival of Dionysia. This is why he states that he chose to bring a *graphēn hybreōs* (γραφὴν ὕβρεως) into court, which had to do with offences where the insult against the litigant involved a serious assault by the defendant and consisted a crime which, according to the law of *hybris*, had a public character and concerned all citizens; this is the reason that the law stated that anyone

---

<sup>49</sup> *Probolē* (προβολή): it was applied in circumstances where religious festivals and mysteries were concerned, or cases of sycophancy, abuse of public money or inadequate implementation of public duty: see lemma *probole* in: [http://www.stoa.org/projects/demos/article\\_law\\_glossary?page=all&greekEncoding=/](http://www.stoa.org/projects/demos/article_law_glossary?page=all&greekEncoding=/) (access on December 12<sup>th</sup>, 2013).

<sup>50</sup> For the various opinions on the matter see Harris (1989).

<sup>51</sup> See Christ (2006) 165-170 and Fisher (2003) 194-195 for the reciprocity which develops between the rich and poor. In *In Leptinem* (34 and 142) Demosthenes characterizes χορηγούς as benefactors: τί οὖν οἴεσθ', ὧ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τοῦτον τὸν τοιοῦτον περι ὑμᾶς γεγεννημένον, ἐὰν ἀκούσῃ νόμῳ τὴν ἀτέλειαν ὑμᾶς ἀφηρημένους αὐτὸν καὶ μηδ' ἂν μεταδόξῃ ποτὲ ψηφισαμένους ἐξεῖναι δοῦναι; (What, then, men of Athens, do you expect of this man, who has proved himself such a friend to you, if he learns that you have deprived him by law of his immunity, and have made it illegal to bestow it hereafter, even if you change your minds?) ...**ἔστι τοίνυν πάντα ταῦτ', ὧ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, δικαιοσύνης, ἀρετῆς, μεγαλοψυχίας ἐπιδείγματα.** μη τοίνυν δι' ἃ πάλαι παρὰ πάντα τὸν χρόνον ἡ πόλις εὐδοξεῖ, ταῦτ' ἀνέλητε νῦν· **μηδ' ἵνα Λεπτινῆς ἰδίᾳ τισίν, οἷς ἀηδῶς ἔχει, ἐπηρεάσῃ, τῆς πόλεως ἀφέλησθε καὶ ὑμῶν αὐτῶν ἦν διὰ παντός ἀεὶ τοῦ χρόνου δόξαν κέκτησθε καλήν·** μηδ' ὑπολαμβάνετε εἶναι τὸν ἀγῶνα τόνδ' ὑπὲρ ἄλλου τινός ἢ τοῦ τῆς πόλεως ἀξιώματος, πότερον αὐτὸ δεῖ σῶν εἶναι καὶ ὁμοιον τῷ προτέρῳ, ἢ μεθεστάναι καὶ λελυμάνθαι. All these, men of Athens, are proofs of justice, of virtue, of magnanimity. Then do not now destroy the very qualities on which throughout its history our city's reputation is founded; do not, in order that Leptines may vent his spite on men whom he dislikes, rob both yourselves and your city of the fair fame that has been yours in every age; do not suppose that anything else is at stake in this trial save the honor of Athens, whether it is to stand unimpaired as of old, or to pass into neglect and degradation. (Translation by C. A. Vince and J. H. Vince, Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press; London, William Heinemann Ltd. 1926). The rich, however, often felt compelled by the state to consume a large proportion of their property for public deeds, and this sometimes led them to make efforts in order to avoid a liturgy: Gabrielsen (1994) 53-60; Cohen (1992) 192 ff. and Christ (2006) 191 ff.

from among the citizen body had the right to sue the offender.<sup>52</sup> Based on this, Demosthenes states that he chose to prosecute Meidias on a *graphēn hybreōs* not only because of the seriousness of the offence, but also because the defendant, if defeated in court, would pay a fine not to the prosecutor but to the city. Demosthenes thus shows that the recompense that he sought was not monetary, but the rehabilitation of his lost dignity.

Demosthenes' reference to his *choregia* is a point which serves a twofold purpose. On the one hand, Demosthenes wishes to take advantage of the public character of Meidias' case, consequently he chooses to stress this point which is closely related to his beneficial actions as a democratic citizen towards the public interest. On the other hand, the mentioning of the *choregia* could be seen as an element of the performative character of this trial; Demosthenes presents himself as having undertaken the "role" of the *choregos*, before the eyes of the audience-spectators, in the Athenian society of *theōrein* (watching festivals), while Meidias came and destroyed his "performance".<sup>53</sup> The fact that he speaks about his "performance" as *choregos* on the specific day of Meidias' assault towards him, while, on the day of the trial, he gives another "performance" as the accuser of Meidias, makes the performative impression of this trial even stronger, as in both cases he exploits the display (*epideixis*) of "embodying forth authority, glamour, position".<sup>54</sup> The orator perfects his self-presentation and self-promotion as a magnificent benefactor, whilst Meidias comes forward as the destroyer of Demosthenes' "performance".<sup>55</sup>

A close look at §§152-164 of the oration reveals that the orator creates for Meidias the image of a very rich man, whose wealth makes him tight-fisted, arrogant and not at all benevolent; and that furthermore this wealth led him to a provocatively luxurious way of life, which he never fails to demonstrate to the public. In §158 the orator initially asks a rhetorical question: τίς οὖν ἢ λαμπρότης, ἢ τίνες αἱ λητουργίαι καὶ τὰ σέμν' ἀναλώματα τούτου; Demosthenes questions Meidias' beneficial acts towards the city; in fact, he says that there are no liturgies, no λαμπρότης<sup>56</sup> and no σέμν' ἀναλώματα on behalf of Meidias. On the contrary, the only

---

<sup>52</sup> Fisher (1990) 126, 132, (1992) 41-43. For the charge against Meidias see Rowe (1993).

<sup>53</sup> The notion of "performance" may carry various meanings, but, according to Carlson, all performances need the observer of the action, an audience.

<sup>54</sup> Goldhill (1999) 3.

<sup>55</sup> Confer Goldhill (1999) 8-9.

<sup>56</sup> *lamprotēs* here appears as a synonym of *megaloprepeia*, which means spending money for the public good; see Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics* 1122b 17-23: ...καὶ ἔστιν ἔργου ἀρετή, μεγαλοπρέπεια, ἐν μεγέθει. Ἔστι δὲ τῶν δαπανημάτων οἷα λέγομεν τὰ τίμια, οἷον τὰ περι θεοῦς, ἀναθήματα καὶ κατασκευαὶ καὶ θυσίαι, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ περι πᾶν τὸ δαιμόνιον, καὶ ὅσα πρὸς τὸ κοινὸν εὐφιλοτιμητὰ ἔστιν, οἷον εἴ που χορηγεῖν οἴονται δεῖν λαμπρῶς ἢ τριηραρχεῖν ἢ καὶ ἐστιᾶν τὴν πόλιν: ...and excellence in an achievement involves greatness. Now there are some forms of expenditure definitely entitled honorable, for instance expenditure on the service of the gods votive offerings, public buildings, sacrifices and the offices of religion generally; and those public benefactions which are favorite objects of ambition, for instance the duty, as it is esteemed in certain states, of equipping a chorus splendidly or

λαμπρότητα and ἀναλώματα that Meidias has shown are only about himself; and these ἀναλώματα are far from σεμνά. He makes large expenses only for himself: he owns a huge residence in Eleusina, which outshines all the other houses in the area (ὥστε πᾶσιν ἐπισκοτεῖν), he uses two white Sicyonian horses for his wife's transportation (ἐπὶ τοῦ λευκοῦ ζεύγους τοῦ ἐκ Σικυῶνος) and himself διὰ τῆς ἀγορᾶς σοβεῖ (swaggers about the market-place) having with him τρεῖς ἀκολούθους ἢ τέτταρας and κυμβία καὶ ῥυτὰ καὶ φιάλας ὀνομάζων, so that all passers-by could listen to him. Demosthenes sketches Meidias as arrogant and a boaster, who does not miss an opportunity to demonstrate his excessive wealth to his fellow citizens. The orator here deploys *ekphrasis*,<sup>57</sup> as a means of presenting before the eyes of the jurors a vivid image of the garish Meidias,<sup>58</sup> who walks around the agora scorning the democratic value of equality among the citizens: his boastful arrogance has exceeded the acceptable *metron*, so that it has become *hybris*: ἂ δ' ἐπαιρόμενος τούτοις ὑβρίζει.<sup>59</sup>

What Demosthenes states here is that Meidias has offered no money of his own in order to benefit the city: οὐκ οἶδ' ὅ τι τοὺς πολλοὺς ὑμῶν ὠφελεῖ. Despite the fact that he is one of the richest (ὅσα μὲν τῆς ἰδίας τρυφῆς εἵνεκα Μειδίας καὶ περιουσίας κτᾶται), he only undertook a liturgy when he was forced to, either because he was included in the one thousand and two hundred citizens who were responsible for the trierarchy,<sup>60</sup> or because he was compelled due to the *antidosis*<sup>61</sup> procedure, as Demosthenes states in paragraph 156.<sup>62</sup> What comes across, therefore, is that Meidias did not show the appropriate *philotimia*<sup>63</sup> as a wealthy citizen, which would mitigate his misbehaviour against Demosthenes. On the contrary, he acts as if his wealth gives

---

fitting out a ship of war, or even of giving a banquet to the public (Translation by H. Rackham. Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press; London, William Heinemann Ltd. 1934).

<sup>57</sup> For an extant analysis of *ekphrasis* in ancient literature see Serafim (2015) 97-98.

<sup>58</sup> Quintilian some centuries later spoke of *visiones*; see Tellegen-Couperus (2003) 148. Cf. Quint. *Inst. Or.* VI 2,34.

<sup>59</sup> It is interesting that Demosthenes uses the word *hybris* only once in this paragraph, although Meidias' arrogance is quite excessive. It seems that Demosthenes wants to *imply* the notion of *hybris* more than to explicitly refer to it, possibly because he is more interested in depicting a man who is a show-off.

<sup>60</sup> For the *symmoriai* see Christ (2006) 150.

<sup>61</sup> Christ (2006) 159-160.

<sup>62</sup> *Against Meidias*, 155-156: Ἀλλὰ μὴν τί ἄλλο; τραγωδοῖς κεχορήγηκέ ποθ' οὔτος, ἐγὼ δ' αὐλήταῖς ἀνδράσιν. Καὶ ὅτι τοῦτο τάνάλωμ' ἐκείνης τῆς δαπάνης πλεόν ἐστὶ πολλῶ, οὐδεὶς ἀγνοεῖ δήπου. Κἀγὼ μὲν ἐθελοντῆς νῦν, οὔτος δὲ καταστάς ἐξ ἀντιδόσεως τότε, οὗ χάριν οὐδεμίαν δήπου δικαίως ἂν τις ἔχοι. Τί ἔτι εισίακα τὴν φυλὴν ἐγὼ καὶ Παναθηναίοις κεχορήγηκα, οὔτος δ' οὐδέτερα: Well, is there anything else? He has once equipped a tragic chorus; I have furnished a band of male flute-players; and everyone knows that the latter involves much greater expense than the former. Moreover, my service is voluntary; his was only undertaken after a challenge to exchange property. Therefore no one could justly allow him any credit for it. What else? I have feasted my tribe and equipped a chorus for the Panathenaea; he has done neither (Translation by A.T. Murray, Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press; London, William Heinemann Ltd. 1939).

<sup>63</sup> *philotimia* meant the love for honour, which led wealthy citizens eagerly to spend money for the public benefit; see Whitehead (1983) 60, Wilson (2003) 192, Skultety (2009) 48). There were cases though where *philotimia* meant the selfish claim for honour, as in the case of Meidias.

him an “excuse”, in other words the power and the right, to look down on the rest of his fellow citizens.

The fact that Meidias has never “donated” his wealth for the public benefit but, on the contrary, his wealth has only been used by him, for his own well-being and delight, could easily arouse the indignation of his fellow citizens<sup>64</sup> and, as a result, it is exploited by the speaker so as to discriminate Meidias from the rest of the citizens. According to Aristotle, whereas indignation is felt towards someone’s unmerited good fortune, envy is malicious jealousy towards our equals; in the first case, this is a justified sentiment which derives from the anger towards someone who enjoys prosperity and well-being and is not regarded to be worthy of it.<sup>65</sup> It is highly possible that this sentiment is what Demosthenes aims to arouse among his audience, since he sketches Meidias as a person with excessive self-esteem and a lack of decency towards his fellow citizens. Thus the *ēthos* of Meidias which is constructed here is that of a vicious rich man, a prosperous aristocrat, who has contempt for his fellow citizens and uses his wealth only for his own luxury, but without having the modesty to avoid showing off his riches<sup>66</sup>; it is inevitable, then, that such a person would provoke the indignation of others.

We have seen already that the orator has used vocabulary which displays Meidias’ wealth so that the *pathos* of jealousy will be aroused to the audience. What is strongly performative in the section in question is that the orator does not restrict his speech only to the mere reference of Meidias’ excessive wealth. Instead, he attempts to “present” Meidias’ actions before the eyes of the audience, as descriptively as he can, manipulating the audience and the jurors to visualize a lively persona, close to an Aristophanic hero, whose acts and noises are more than excessive. As in *Against Conon*, Demosthenes creates a “performance” within the trial and does not limit his construction of Meidias’ *ēthopoia* to a mere reference of Meidias’ unethical behaviour. On the contrary, the orator portrays Meidias’ actions, gestures and tones of voice exploiting the skill of “performative imagination”, aiming to make the audience imagine a character whose *ēthos* results from his chosen words and deeds.<sup>67</sup>

On the other hand, Meidias’ *schema*, that is, his physical appearance, is given by Demosthenes as descriptively as possible. A schema is an appearance of what is seen, a “form”, epitomized by a man’s gait (*badisma*), expression, voice and attitude, and “it is a fundamental expression for the

---

<sup>64</sup> Fisher (2003) argues that the unwillingness of the rich to give parts of their fortune for the public good could often be utilized by the orators in order to stimulate envy to the audiences.

<sup>65</sup> Aristotle *Rhet.* 1386b ff.

<sup>66</sup> See also Ober (1994) 95.

<sup>67</sup> Confer Fredal (2003) 253.

embodiment of *epideixis* in the agonistic world of the *polis*".<sup>68</sup> In addition, schema is "the composed form of an observed phenomenon," thus it is something "modelled, learnt and made up"<sup>69</sup>, a key element of performance. Subsequently, Meidias' description and appearance, his expressions and his attitude, compose his *schema* which is presented to the "gaze of the citizens" for their evaluation and verdict. Additionally, Demosthenes' composition of Meidias' description is another *schema*, which verbally expresses Meidias' actions. Both interpretations of *schema* construct the embodiment of *epideixis* and make it fundamental to the "performance of the citizen".<sup>70</sup>

As far as the *hypokrisis* of this section is concerned, it is interesting to explore Demosthenes' rhetorical techniques. The rhetorical question in section 158 is divided into three parts: τίς οὖν ἢ λαμπρότης, ἢ τίνες αἱ λητουργίαι καὶ τὰ σέμν' ἀναλώματα τούτου; The pronouns introduce the rhetorical questions and are naturally accentuated by the speaker. The answer that Demosthenes gives to his rhetorical questions includes an emphasized negation: ἐγὼ μὲν γὰρ οὐχ ὀρῶ. In the long periodic sentence which follows, where Demosthenes gives examples of Meidias' τρυφή, we can imagine the orator raising his voice to a crescendo as he utters the colons ἐπὶ τοῦ λευκοῦ ζεύγους τοῦ ἐκ Σικυῶνος, καὶ τρεῖς ἀκολούθους ἢ τέτταρας αὐτὸς ἔχων διὰ τῆς ἀγορᾶς σοβεῖ, κυμβία καὶ ῥυτὰ καὶ φιάλας ὀνομάζων, especially emphasizing τρεῖς, τέτταρας and σοβεῖ, adding a little, or perhaps a large amount of irony, as he would make a suitable gesture to represent how Meidias and his servants arrogantly walked around the agora, while Meidias spoke loudly – σοβεῖ – about his precious weighing dishes (κυμβία καὶ ῥυτὰ καὶ φιάλας). It is impossible that such a figure would remain unnoticed by the rest of the citizens; and that is exactly Demosthenes' intention here: that everybody, the jurors and the whole city, realize that Meidias is a person who constantly tries to draw attention from the others; he is a loud and insolent aristocrat who behaves with contempt not only to his inferiors but also to the city's laws.<sup>71</sup>

In the rest of section 159, Demosthenes also uses suitable vocabulary in order to distinguish Meidias from the rest of his fellow citizens, including the judges: he states that "you, who are many, have nothing to gain from Meidias' possessions, which are used for his own luxury" (ἐγὼ δ' ὅσα μὲν τῆς ἰδίας τρυφῆς εἵνεκα Μειδίας καὶ περιουσίας κτᾶται, οὐκ οἶδ' ὅ τι τοὺς πολλοὺς ὑμῶν ὠφελεῖ). Here, through the *antithesis*<sup>72</sup> between Meidias and the rest of the citizens, the orator distinguishes Meidias' luxury from the mass of the citizens, and his voice will give the emphasis to this. He then continues by saying that Meidias' arrogance, which is *hybris*, has

---

<sup>68</sup> Goldhill (1999) 4-5.

<sup>69</sup> *ibid* 4-5.

<sup>70</sup> *ibid* 5.

<sup>71</sup> Harris (2008) 10, 12

<sup>72</sup> For the antitheton between sentences see Lausberg (1998) 352.

affected many of the citizens (ἃ δ' ἐπαιρόμενος τούτοις ὑβρίζει, ἐπὶ πολλοὺς καὶ τοὺς τυχόντας ἡμῶν ἀφικνούμεν' ὀρώ); here again Meidias is discerned and isolated from the rest of the citizens, while the orator most probably would make a friendly gesture towards the audience, when uttering ἐπὶ πολλοὺς καὶ τοὺς τυχόντας ἡμῶν. It is no coincidence that he uses the pronoun ἡμῶν instead of ὑμῶν; as with the previous periodic sentence, he seeks to include himself into the set of the citizens and, at the same time, to exclude Meidias as an “intruder”, while, at the same time, he serves the public character of the trial. The orator ends with the conclusion that a wealthy man's *philotimia* should be measured according to what he offers to the state, because these are deeds which all citizens can enjoy and partake in (οὐδὲ τὴν φιλοτιμίαν ἐκ τούτων κρίνειν, εἴ τις οἰκοδομεῖ λαμπρῶς ἢ θεραπαίνας κέκτηται πολλὰς ἢ σκεύη [καλά], ἀλλ' ὅς ἂν ἐν τούτοις λαμπρὸς καὶ φιλότιμος ᾗ, ὧν ἅπανι μέτεστι τοῖς πολλοῖς ὑμῶν). But, Demosthenes concludes, none of this is Meidias' advantage (ὧν οὐδὲν εὐρήσετε τούτῳ προσόν). Thus, Demosthenes in *Against Meidias* has constructed the *ēthos* of Meidias as that of a prosperous but self-centred aristocrat, whose life-style provokes resentment and indignation by his fellow citizens. After all, as Demosthenes remarks in par. 151: “Meidias is the real composer of my speech.”

## Conclusion

This study of *ēthopoia* and *hypokrisis* in *Against Conon* and *Against Meidias* has elaborated primarily on the relationship between *ēthos* and *pathos*, which together create a successful character presentation based on the rhetorical strategy of the orator. What is noteworthy is that *ēthopoia* and *hypokrisis* are not examined merely as rhetorical techniques but also, and most importantly, as integral parts of the performance of the trial: the paper has demonstrated that *ēthopoia*, as character presentation, and *hypokrisis*, as *lexis/style*, may function in a performative dimension. Despite the fact that Conon's sons were prosecuted in a *dikē*, whilst Meidias' was a public trial, in both orations Demosthenes presents the prosecuted as a public danger, who needs to be eliminated. Demosthenes depicts both Conon's sons and Meidias as offenders who have overreached what is thought to be *metrion* and acceptable by the Athenian citizen, in a way that the audience would consider them as *hybristas*. However, in *Against Meidias*, Demosthenes makes much more use of the contrast between the one and the many, exploiting the public character of the trial. As far as the *hypokrisis* is concerned, as has been shown in the selected passages, it is evident that the orator adequately adjusts the way he organizes his *lexis/style* according to the *ēthos* and *pathos*, aiming at the construction of a “performance”, in which the audience are presented with a powerful impression of a “vicious” offender, as far as Conon's sons and Meidias are concerned.



## References

- Arnott, P. D. 1991. *Public and Performance in the Greek Theatre*. Taylor & Francis.
- Cairns, D.L. 1996. "Hybris, Dishonour and Thinking Big", *Journal of Hellenic Studies* 116, 1-32.
- Carey, C., and Reid, R. A. 1985. *Demosthenes: Selected Private Speeches*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Cartledge, P.A., Millet, P.C., Todd, S. 1990. *Nomos: Essays in Athenian Law, Politics and Society*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Gabrielsen, V. 1994. *Financing the Athenian Fleet: Public Taxation and Social Relations*. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Cirillo, Th. 2009. "Transferable Disgust in Demosthenes 54: Against Conon", in *Syllecta Classica* 20.1: 1-30.
- Cohen, E. E. 1992. *Athenian Economy and Society: A Banking Perspective*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Christ, M. 2006. *The Bad Citizen in Classical Athens*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

- Fredal, J. 2001. "The Language of Delivery and the Presentation of Character: Rhetorical Action in Demosthenes' Against Meidias." *Rhetoric Review* v.20 no. 3/4, 251-267.
- Fischer-Lichte, E. 2010. "Performance as Event - Reception as Transformation" in Hall, E. and Harrop, S. (Eds.), *Theorising Performance: Greek Drama, Cultural History and Critical Practice*. London: Bloomsbury Academic.
- Fisher, N. 1990. "The Law of *Hybris* in Athens" in Cartledge, P.A. Millet, P.C. Todd, S. (eds) *Nomos: Essays in Athenian Law, Politics and Society*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 123-138.
- 1992. *Hybris*. Warminster: Brill.
- 2003. "Let Envy be Absent: Envy, Liturgies and Reciprocity in Athens", in Konstan, D. and Rutter, N.K. (eds): *Envy, Spite and Jealousy: The Rivalrous Emotions in Ancient Greece*. Edinburgh, pp. 181-215.
- Goldhill, S. and Osborne, R. 1999. *Performance Culture and Athenian Democracy*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Graff, R. 2001. "Reading and the Written Style in Aristotle's Rhetoric". *Rhetoric Society Quarterly*, 31:4, 19-44.
- Gunderson, E. 2000. *Staging Masculinity: The Rhetoric of Performance in the Roman World*. Michigan: University of Michigan Press.
- 2009. *The Cambridge Companion to Ancient Rhetoric*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Hall, E. 1995. *Lawcourt Dramas*. London: Brill.
- Hall, E. and Harrop, S. (Eds.) 2010. *Theorising Performance: Greek Drama, Cultural History and Critical Practice*. London: Bloomsbury Academic.
- Halliwell, St. 1991. "The Uses of Laughter in Greek Culture", *CQ* 41: 2, 279-296.
- Harris, E. M. 1989. "Demosthenes' Speech Against Meidias", *HSCP* 92: 117-136.
- 2008. *Demosthenes, Speeches 20-22*. Austin: University of Texas Press.
- Innes, D. C. 2007. "Aristotle: The Written and the Performative Styles". Mirhady, D. (ed.), *Influences on Peripatetic Rhetoric: Essays in Honor of William W. Fortenbaugh*, 151-168. London: Brill.

- Kirby, J. T. 1991. "Aristotle's Poetics: The Rhetorical Principle" in *Classics Articles and Papers*, Paper 1.
- Lanni, A. M. 1997. "Spectator Sport or Serious Politics? οί περιεστηκότες and the Athenian Lawcourts". *JHS*, 117, 183-189.
- Lausberg, H. 1998. *Handbook of Literary Rhetoric*. Leiden: Leiden University Press.
- Mac Dowell, D. M. 1978. *The Law in Classical Athens*. London: Brill.
- 1990. *Demosthenes Against Meidias (Oration 21)*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Morford P. O. M. 1966. "Ethopoiia and Character-Assassination in the Conon of Demosthenes". *Mnemosyne* Vol. 19, Fasc. 3, 241-248.
- Ober, J. 1994. "Oratory and Power in Democratic Athens: Demosthenes 21, Against Meidias,". I. Worthington (ed.), *Persuasion: Greek Rhetoric in Action*, 85-108. London and New York: Routledge
- Osborne, R. 1985. "Law in Action in Classical Athens", *JHS* 105, 40–58.
- Pickard-Cambridge W. A. 1962. *Dithyramb, Tragedy and Comedy*. 2nd edition, revised by T. B. L. Webster. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Pütz, B. 2007. *The Symposium and Komos in Aristophanes*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Ricoeur, P. 1996. "Between Rhetoric and Poetics". *Essays on Aristotle's Rhetoric*, 324-384.
- Rowe, G. O. 1993. "The Many facets of Hybris in Demosthenes' Against Meidias". *American Journal of Philology*, 114, No.3, 397-406.
- Schmitz, Th. A. 2000. "Plausibility in the Greek Orators". *American Journal of Philology*, 121, No.1, 47-77.
- Serafim, A. 2015. "Making the Audience: *Ekphrasis* and Rhetorical Strategy in Demosthenes 18 and 19." *CQ* 65, 96-108.
- 2017. *Attic Oratory and Performance*. New York and London: Routledge.
- 2018. *Conventions in/as Performance: Addressing the Audience in Selected Public Speeches of Demosthenes* in Papaioannou S., Serafim, A., DaVela, B. (eds.), *Theatre of Justice: Aspects of Performance in Greco-Roman Oratory and Rhetoric*. New York: Brill.
- Shepherd, S., & Wallis, M. 2004. *Drama/Theatre/Performance*. London: Routledge.

- Sifakis, G. M. 1998. "Agonismata in Thucydides and Aristotle". *BICS*, 42:1, 21-27.
- Skultety, S. C. 2009. "Competition in the Best of Cities: Agonism and Aristotle's *Politics*". *Political Theory*, 37: 1, 44-68.
- Sonkowsky, R. P. 1959. "An Aspect of Delivery in Ancient Rhetorical Theory", *TAPhA* 90, 256-274.
- Stehle, E. 2014. *Performance and Gender in Ancient Greece: Nondramatic Poetry in its Setting*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Tellegen - Couperus, O. E. 2003. *Quintilian and the Law: The Art of Persuasion in Law and Politics*. Leuven: Leuven University Press.
- Todd, S.C. 2003. *A Glossary of Athenian Legal Terms, Selections by Michael de Brauw*, edition of March 16, 2003 in *The Stoa: A Consortium for Electronic Publication in the Humanities*.  
 <<http://www.stoa.org/projects/demos/home?greekEncoding=>>
- Webb, Ruth. 2013. *Ekphrasis, Imagination and Persuasion in Ancient Rhetorical Theory and Practice*. London: Ashgate Publishing, Ltd.
- Whitehead, D. 1983. "Competitive Outlay and Community Profit: *φιλοτιμία* in Democratic Athens." *Classica et Mediaevalia* 34: 55-74.
- Wilson, P.J. 1991. "Demosthenes 21 (against Meidias): Democratic Abuse". *PCPhS* 37, 164-195.
- Wilson, P. 2003. *The Athenian Institution of the Khoregia: The Chorus, the City and the Stage*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Wooten, C. W. 1977. "A Few Observations on Form and Content in Demosthenes". *Phoenix*, 31, No. 3, 258-261.
- Worman, N. 2008. *Abusive Mouths in Classical Athens*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Worthington, I. 1994. *Persuasion: Greek Rhetoric in Action*. London and New York: Routledge.